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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal presents questions concerning whether the Appellants Scott G. Gatewood 
("Gatewood"), and the law firm Sallaz and Gatewood Chtd. ("Sallaz & Gatewood"), breached any 
duties owed to an allegedly "mentally impaired client," upon which that client, the Respondent 
Pamela K. Joerger Stephen, was entitled to a judgment against Gatewood and Sallaz & Gatewood 
for legal malpractice. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Respondent Pamela K. Joerger Stephen filed a malpractice complaint against her 
attorney Scott G. Gatewood, and the law firm of Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., on August 4, 2006. 
Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd, et aI., 4th Dist. Ada Co. Case No. CV OC 0614241. (R., pg. 
3). This malpractice action was based upon the Defendant Gatewood's representation of the 
Respondent Stephen in her divorce action that had been commenced against by her then-husband, 
Gary Stephen, in 2003. Stephen v. Stephen, 4th Dist. Ada Co. Case No. CV DR 03-011S1D. 
On May S, 2008 the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment that was heard on June 
10, 2008 requesting the dismissal of Stephen's malpractice action based upon the doctrines of 
judgmental immunity and judicial estoppel. Based upon affidavits filed by Stephen in opposition 
to the motion for summary judgment the district court found that there was sufficient evidence before 
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the court on the issue of whether Stephen was disabled by her bi-polar disorder that judicial estoppel 
would not bar her action. (Tr., pg. 39, L. 3 to pg. 40, L. 8). The district court also found sufficient 
evidence in the record presented to deny the motion for summary judgment based upon the doctrine 
of judgmental immunity. (Tr., pg. 40, L. 9 to pg. 41, L. 25). 
Almost one year after the malpractice action had been commenced the parties entered into 
a stipulation for the joinder of Dennis Sallaz as a defendant in that action by the filing an amended 
complaint. (R., pg. 5, and Appellant's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal). 
Ultimately, the parties agreed to waive a jury trial (Tr., pg. 88, L. 13 to pg. 90, L. 16), and 
Stephen's malpractice action went to trial before the district court on August 12,14, and 18,2008. 
(Tr., pp. 98-612). 
After the Respondent Stephen had presented her case in chief at trial the defendants moved 
for a Rule 50 dismissal, which the district court denied, by finding that, "there was certainly 
information available to Mr. Gatewood that that, plus the hospitalization recently prior to going into 
court, certainly that required an additional independent investigation." (Tr., pg. 490, LL. 9-13). 
After the conclusion ofthe trial the district court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on October 3, 2008, and issued a Judgment on December 1, 2008 awarding Stephen 
$27,435.00 in damages against the law firm of Sallaz & Gatewood, and against Scott Gatewood, 
individually, but not as against Dennis Sallaz, individually. (See, Appellant's 12/21109 Motion to 
Augment the Record on Appeal). 
APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - PAGE 10 
The district court entered an Amended Judgment on February 9, 2009 (R, pp. 73-75), and on 
March 19, 2009 a notice of appeal was filed by Sallaz & Gatewood, and Scott Gatewood, from the 
malpractice judgment, and by Dennis Sallaz from the district court's denial of attorney fees to him. 
(R., pp. 82-87). In order to stay execution upon the judgment the appellants made a cash deposit 
with the clerk ofthe court on June 16,2009 in the amount of$53,604.06. See, Appellants' 6/28110 
Second Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal. 
On July 24, 2009 that part of this appeal which had been deemed to arise from the December 
1, 2008 final judgment on the legal malpractice claim was dismissed on the basis that the appeal, as 
tiled on March 19, 2009, was untimely from the date of that judgment. The Appellant Sallaz's 
appeal from the district court's February 9, 2009 denial of his request for attorney fees was deemed 
timely, as based upon the March 19,2009 notice of appeal. As a result of this initial dismissal of 
the appeal the Respondent Pam Stephen obtained an order from the Supreme Court directing the 
district court to release that portion of those funds necessary to satisfY the malpractice judgment, 
which was accomplished on November 6, 2009. 
On March 31, 2010, based upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Goodman Oil Co. 
v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 148 Idaho 588, 226 P.3d 530 (February 3, 2010), counsel for 
the appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court's July 24, 2009 order 
dismissing the malpractice portion of the appeal as untimely based upon the December 1, 2009 
judgment. On May 24,2010 the Supreme Court granted the appellant's motion for reconsideration 
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with leave to file this Supplemental Brief to address the issues raised in the original notice of appeal 
concerning the malpractice judgment. Contemporaneously with the filing of this supplemental brief, 
the appellants have also filed a motion to augment the record on appeal to restore those portions of 
that record which had been requested in the original notice of appeal, but that had not been made a 
part of the original record on appeal based upon the Supreme Court's July 24,2009 dismissal order. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about June 16,2003 Pamela K. Joerger Stephen engaged the services of attorney Scott 
G. Gatewood to represent her in a divorce action and signed a fee agreement with Mr. Gatewood. 
(See, "Fee Agreement," as attached to Appellant's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on 
Appeal). Gatewood was then - as he is now - a member of the law firm, Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. 
As stated in more detail in the Statement of the Facts submitted with Appellant's Opening 
Brief on this appeal, the district court ultimately found that the Appellant Dennis 1. Sallaz had no 
personal liability to the Respondent Stephen on her legal malpractice claim, which question was also 
raised and addressed in the district court's amended judgment entered on February 9,2009. (R., pp. 
73-75; See, October 3, 2008 Findings of Fact, as attached to Appellant's 12/21109 Motion to 
Augment the Record on Appeal. 
At the time that Gatewood first interviewed Stephen when she was retaining him to represent 
her in the divorce action she revealed to him that she had been diagnosed with a bi-polar disorder. 
But other than the very fact of the existence of this diagnosis he did not observe anything in her 
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conduct, behavior, or speech that led to him believe that she lacked the ability and competence to 
fully understand the pending divorce proceedings. (Tr., pg. 165, L. 21 to pg. 166, L. 13; pg. 217, LL. 
1-19; pg. 220, LL. 6-19; pg. 226, L. 25 to pg. 228, L. 14). 
In addition, it was ultimately revealed that Pam Stephen was using methamphetamine during 
the time leading up to the divorce. (Tr., pg. 191, L. 20 to pg. 192, L. 25; pg., 201, LL. 19-23). And 
there were at least two instances in which Pam Stephen was hospitalized as a result of her drug use 
and psychological condition. (January 2004 hospitalization, Tr., pg. 199, L. 7 to pg. 202, L. 4; July 
2004 hospitalization, Tr., pg. 413, LL. 18-21; pg. 414, LL. 19-21). The divorce trial was scheduled 
for August 5, 2004. 
There was a period of time during his representation of Pam Stephen that she did not stay in 
communication with Mr. Gatewood or return his telephone calls. Mr. Gatewood made at least five 
trips to Pam Stephen's home in an attempt to contact her and to communicate with her about her 
case. (Tr., pg. 206, L. 24, to pg. 207, L. 3). Ultimately, Mr. Gatewood did file amotion to withdraw, 
but shortly thereafter communication with Ms. Stephen was restored and he agreed to continue to 
represent her in the divorce proceeding. (Tr., pg. 212, LL. 13-23). 
During the course of his representation of Ms. Stephen Mr. Gatewood began to discover 
disturbing facts about her then-current living situation, including that her estranged husband, Gary 
Stephen, had left the family residence on Crescent Rim in Boise, but that he continued to pay all the 
expenses associated with the upkeep of that residence. (Tr., pg. 191, LL. 1-19). In turn, Ms. Stephen 
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had moved her boyfriend, lody Kimmel, into the house, and neither she, nor Mr. Kimmel, appeared 
to have any independent means of support, other than the money provided by Mr. Stephen. 
In addition, Mr. Kimmel's ex-wife and her boyfriend were living in another property owned 
by Mr. Stephen - the Beach Street house, for which occupancy they failed to pay rent. (Tr., pg. 192, 
LL. 5-14; pg. 290, LL. 18-22; pg. 508, LL. 9-14). Consequently, Mr. Stephen had to pay the 
arrearages on the mortgage on that property to keep it from going into foreclosure. (Tr., pg., 296, 
LL. 2-15). Eventually, there was drug raid on the Beach Street house, and it underwent considerable 
waste during its occupancy by the Kimmels. (Tr., pg. 524, L. 1 to pg. 525, L. 24). 
Because the issue of obtaining "maintenance," so that Pam Stephen would have some 
continuing means of support, was a prominent issue in this matter from the time that Scott Gatewood 
first commenced his representation of her, he initialing filed a motion for temporary support on her 
behalf. Ultimately though, he calculated that under the status quo Pam Stephen was then receiving 
about $4,000 per month in benefits from her estranged husband Gary Stephen, such that he did not 
believe that he could obtain a better outcome for her by seeking temporary support, so the motion 
was withdrawn. (Tr., pg. 190, LL. 3-8). 
After the divorce proceeding was filed Mr. and Mrs. Stephen were able to settle almost all 
of the property issues through a mediation conducted by Boise attorney Stephen Beer. (Tr., pg. 222, 
L. 18 to pg. 223, L. 22). Only two prominent issues remained to be settled after the mediation: (1) 
spousal maintenance, and (2) the valuation of the Crescent Rim residence. In his initial interrogatory 
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response Gary Stephen placed a $500,000 valuation on the Crescent Rim residence, but his attorney, 
Ann Shepard, testified at the malpractice trial that this was simply a number that they picked out in 
order to respond to the interrogatory, and that her client, Gary Stephen, was deferring to Pam 
Shepard's valuation of the residence, because she was more knowledgeable on that subject. (Tr., pg. 
504, L. 14 to pg. 505, L. 12; pg. 539, L. 10 to pg. 540, L. 8). 
On behalfofGary Stephen, his attorney Ann Shepard offered what, she considered to be very 
favorable settlement terms, to Pam Stephen. (Tr.,pg. 537, LL. 6-11). Ms. Shepard advised Scott 
Gatewood that considering the underlying facts ofthis particular case, that she thought she could get 
a better deal for Gary Stephen if they went to trial, but that he was willing to make this favorable 
offer in order settle the matter without the necessity of going to trial. (Tr., pg. 510, L. 12 to pg. 513, 
L. 5). Scott Gatewood concurred with Ms. Shepard's assessment that he would be unlikely to obtain 
a better deal for his client, Pam Stephen, at trial, than he would be able to obtain through the offered 
settlement. (Tr., pg. 184, LL. 2-22). 
A substantial barrier to obtaining any settlement of this divorce case was Pam Stephen's 
insistence upon obtaining permanent spousal support. The defendants had disclosed Stan Welsh as 
an expert witness, and his deposition was to be taken on July 30, 2008. (Tr., pg. 48, LL. 13-16). 
Counsel for the defendants stated that Mr. Welsh offered his opinion that based upon the facts ofthis 
case there was very little likelihood that Pam Stephen could obtain permanent spousal support. (Tr., 
pg. 640, L. 14 to pg. 641, L. 3; pg. 650, L. 22 to 651, L. 14). Shortly thereafter, the spousal support 
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claim, which amounted to between $300,000 and $400,000 of Pam Stephen's entire claim, was 
dropped from the malpractice action. (Tr., pg. 59, LL. 1-5; pg. 61, LL. 12-13; pg. 83, L. 23 to pg. 
84, L. 3). 
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The elements of a legal malpractice action are: (1) the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship; (2) the existence of a duty on the part ofthe lawyer; (3) failure to perform the duty; and 
(4) the negligence of the lawyer must have been a proximate cause of the damage to the client. 
Harrigfeldv. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 136,90 P.3d 884,886 (2004). 
The existence of a duty is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. 
Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,247,985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999). The plaintiff has the burden of 
proving not only the negligence of the attorney, but also that the negligence was the proximate cause 
of the loss of a right to recover in the underlying case. Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 652 P.2d 
650 (1982). 
A plaintiff must normally produce expert evidence of negligence and causation of damages 
to establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice. Jarman v. Hale, 112 Idaho 270, 273, 731 P.2d 
813,816 (Ct.App.l986). 
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E. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court failed to properly identify, and then to apply, the duty that 
an attorney owes to a client with alleged diminished mental capacity? 
2. Whether, as based upon Scott Gatewood's knowledge and observation of the conduct 
and behavior of his client, Pam Stephen, he should have had reasonably believed on 
August 5,2004 that she was a mentally diminished client who lacked the competence 
to knowingly and voluntarily accept, and enter into, the terms of the stipulated 
divorce settlement? 
3. Whether, in the absence of the evidence necessary to support the existence of Pam 
Stephen's alleged diminished mental capacity, her malpractice claims against Scott 
Gatewood were barred by the doctrines of judicial estoppel and judgmental 
immunity? 
4. Whether, even if Pam Stephen's claims were not barred by the doctrines of judicial 
estoppel and judgmental immunity, the evidence was insufficient to establish any 
breach of a duty constituting legal malpractice by Scott Gatewood? 
5. Whether, as amatteroflaw, ajudgment for legal malpractice can be imposed against 
any person or entity who is not licensed to practice law in the state ofIdaho? 
6. Whether the appellants, if they are the prevailing parties on this appeal, are entitled 
to an award of attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3)? 
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III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Erred In Both Its Declaration And Application Of The Duty 
That Is Owed To A Client Alleged To Have Diminished Mental Capacity When 
That Court Made Its Findings That The Appellant Scott Gatewood Committed 
Legal Malpractice As Result Of A Breach Of That Duty 
The malpractice judgment entered against Scott Gatewood, and against Sallaz & Gatewood, 
Chtd., should be reversed for the following reasons. 
First, there was no evidence presented at trial that established the existence of the threshold 
requirement that Scott Gatewood had observed any conduct or behavior by his client Pam Stephen 
that created in him a "reasonable belief' that she suffered from a diminished mental capacity that 
impaired her ability to knowingly and voluntarily enter into the stipulated divorce judgment. 
Without this required threshold finding, any further inquiry by Scott Gatewood - or for that matter, 
by any lawyer in a similar situation - into the client's medical history would likely be both unethical, 
and a violation of the client's right to privacy. 
Second, there was no evidence presented at trial which established that Pam Stephen actually 
did suffer from any diminished mental capacity on August 5,2004 to an extent that prevented her 
from having the requisite level of competence that is required under Idaho law to enable her to make 
a knowing, voluntary, and binding decision to enter into the stipulated divorce judgment. 
In the absence of evidence sufficient to establish that Pam Stephen lacked the necessary 
mental capacity to knowingly and voluntarily enter into the stipulated divorce judgment, she is bound 
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by the terms of that judgment which she accepted, and she is thereafter estopped under the doctrines 
of judicial estoppel and judgmental immunity from repudiating her voluntary acceptance of those 
terms in order to pursue a claim of malpractice against Scott Gatewood. 
As further argued below, on this appeal Scott Gatewood asserts that the presumption that 
Pam Stephen was mentally competent to enter into the stipulated judgment was never rebutted. 
Consequently, it was reversible error for the district court to find that Mr. Gatewood had breached 
a duty to a mentally diminished client constituting legal malpractice. That duty never arose in this 
case, as based upon the absence of any evidence ofMr. Gatewood's observation of Pam Stephen's 
conduct and behavior upon which he could have formed a "reasonable belief' that she was mentally 
impaired to the extent that she lacked the legal capacity to enter into the binding stipulation 
underlying the divorce judgment. 
The following argument first identifies a lawyer's duty to a mentally diminished client which 
applies to the determination of this appeal, and how that duty is defined and triggered under Idaho 
law. Then the testimony that was presented at trial is reviewed in order to establish that there was 
no evidence presented to the district court that would trigger the operation of this duty, or that would 
support the existence of a breach of that duty by Mr. Gatewood, as based upon the required 
determination that his client, Pam Stephen, actually lacked the requisite mental capacity to 
knowingly and voluntarily enter into the binding stipulation underlying the divorce judgment. 
Because neither the duty, nor its breach, exists based upon the evidence in this case, Pam Stephen's 
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malpractice action was barred by the doctrines of judicial immunity and judgmental immunity. 
Finally, the appellants also present the question of whether a malpractice judgment can be 
entered against a law firm, as a matter of law, and whether the appellants are entitled to an award of 
attorney fees on this appeal. 
1. Under Idaho Law A Client Is Presumed To Be Mentally Competent And 
A Client's Lawyer Is Bound By That Presumption Unless That Lawyer 
Establishes A "Reasonable Belief" That The Client Lacks Mental 
Competence 
At the time that the defendants' motion for summary judgment was heard by the district court 
on June 10, 2008 there was a dispute between the parties as to which party in the action had the 
burden of proof in respect to establishing the competency of a client. (Tr., pg. 32, L. 8 to pg. 33, L. 
1; Tr., pg. 36, LL. 22-25). 
The general rule that the party asserting an affirmative defense has the burden of proof on 
that affirmative defense on a motion for summary judgment is undisputed. Chandler v. Hayden, 147 
Idaho 765, 769-71,215 P .3d 485,489-91 (2009) ("[W]e conclude that a non-moving defendant has 
the burden of supporting a claimed affirmative defense on a motion for summary judgment."). But 
in this case the judicial estoppel affirmative defense is based upon a general presumption of 
competency that exists in Idaho law in respect individuals who enter into stipulations, which are 
governed by the law of contracts. Olson v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 105 Idaho 98, 100,666 
P.2d 188, 190 (1983). A presumption relieves the party in whose favor it operates from the burden 
of presenting further evidence of the presumed fact until the opposing party presents substantial 
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evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. I.R.E. 301; Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571,575, 
759 P.2d 77, 81 (Ct.App.1988). 
Witnesses are presumed to be competent to testifY under I.R.E. 601. The appellants have 
found no Idaho appellate case that has definitively addressed the issue of how the competence of a 
client is to be determined within the context of a an attorney-client relationship in a civil proceeding. 
There is scant related authority. For example, in Koepl v. Ruppert, 29 Idaho 223, 158 P. 319 (1916) 
the Idaho Supreme Court, in a relatively short opinion, upheld the lower court's finding that the 
respondent in that action had temporarily (for two or three days) become incompetent to enter into 
a stipulation, and that therefore the stipulation should be set aside. 
In contrast to the relative lack of Idaho authority in the context of civil proceedings, in 
criminal proceedings this issue is specifically addressed in I.C. § 18-210, 18-211, & 18-212. See 
e.g., Stone v. State, 132 Idaho 490, 492, 975 P.2d 223, 225 (Ct.App.1999) ("The test to detennine 
whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial is whether the defendant has sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and 
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings."). 
As already noted above, stipulations are in the nature of a contract, and are governed by 
contract principles. In respect to contracts Idaho has adopted a statutory presumption that, "All 
persons are capable of contracting, except minors, persons of unsound mind, and persons deprived 
of civil rights." I.C. § 29-101. See generally, Frolik & Radford, SuffiCient Capacity: The 
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Contrasting Capacity Requirementsfor Different Documents, 2 National Academy of Elder Law 
Attorneys Journal 303, 315-320, (2006) (Discussing the capacity needed to enter into a contract). 
There are even statutory exceptions that apply to persons who otherwise have been 
determined to lack the capacity to contract. I.C. §§ 32-106 and 32-107. Furthermore, a person who 
is discharged after having been committed to a treatment facility is presumed to thereafter be 
competent to enter into contracts upon a certification made by a resident physician of that facility. 
I.C. § 32-108. In addition, the specifically enumerated civil rights that are retained by persons who 
have been hospitalized as mentally ill include the "right to enter into contractual relationships." I.e. 
§ 66-346(a)(6). The just-cited statute goes on to declare that, "The director of a facility may deny 
a patient's rights under this section, except that the rights enumerated in subsections (a)(5) and (a)(6) 
of this section, shall not be denied by the director of the facility under any circumstances." I.e. § 
66-346(c). When considered together, all of this Idaho authority is consistent with the recognition 
of a presumption that a person remains competent to contract - even after being admitted to a 
treatment facility - until such time as that person has been adjudicated as being incompetent. 
When this question has been addressed elsewhere, it has been generally held that an 
individual is presumed to be competent. See e.g., Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: 
Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515, 538 n. 96, 
("First, substantive law recognizes a presumption of competence, .... "). The following cases were 
cited in support of this presumption of competence: Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 846 n. 12 (3rd 
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Cir.1981) ("[M]any forms of mental illness have a highly specific impact on the victims, leaving 
decision-making capacity and reasoning ability largely unimpaired."); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 
65, 68 (2nd Cir.l971) ("Absent a specific finding of incompetence, the mental patient retains the 
right to sue or defend in his own name, to sell or dispose of his property, to marry, draft a will, and, 
in general to manage his own affairs."); Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Mental Health, 458 
N.E.2d 308,314-15 (Mass.1983) ("We conclude that a distinct adjudication of incapacity to make 
treatment decisions (incompetence) must precede any determination to override patients' rights to 
make their own treatment decisions .... Other courts have drawn similar conclusions."); In re Moe, 
432 N.E.2d 712, 721 (Mass. 1982) ("A person may be adjudicated legally incompetent to make some 
decisions but competent to make other decisions."); New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. 
Stein, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461, 465 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1972) ("[T]he Court concludes that respondent does have 
the mental capacity to know and understand whether she wishes to consent to electroshock therapy. 
It does not matter whether this Court would agree with her judgment; it is enough that she is capable 
of making a decision, however unfortunate that decision may prove to be."); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 
747, 749 (Ok1.1980) ("Commitment in an institution does not necessarily mean a person is incapable 
of appropriately deciding whether or not he prefers to be treated with psychotropic drugs."); and In 
re Yetter, 62 Pa.D. & C.2d 619, 623 (Pa.Cm.Pl.1973) ("It is clear that mere commitment to a State 
hospital for treatment of mental illness does not destroy a person's competency or require the 
appointment of a guardian of the estate or person: ... If the person was competent while being 
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presented with the decision and in making the decision which she did, the court should not interfere 
even though her decision might be considered unwise, foolish or ridiculous."). 
Based upon these cited authorities this Court is urged to expressly declare in this case that 
Idaho follows a rule that persons are presumed to be competent to contract until adjudicated 
incompetent. 
2. A Lawyer's Duty To Protect A Mentally Diminished Client Only Arises 
After He Has Observed Conduct And Behavior Exhibited By His Client 
That Is Sufficient To Meet The Required Threshold Standard For The 
Lawyer To Establish A "Reasonable Belief' That His Client Lacks 
Mental Competence 
Early on in the proceedings in this case the district court noted that the rules of professional 
responsibility - standing alone - do not provide a basis for civil liability. (Tr., pg. 64, LL. 3-14). 
Yet Rule 1.14 ofthe Idaho Rules of Professional Responsibility, "Client with Diminished Capacity," 
was the primary source relied upon by Pam Stephen to establish the duty, and breach of duty, by 
Scott Gatewood that constituted legal malpractice in this action. 
The Plaintiff Pam Stephen relied upon expert testimony provided by Boise attorney, and 
former magistrate judge, Cathy Naugle, who testified as to the standard of care that applies to an 
attorney representing a client with diminished mental capacity (Tr., pp. 252-283). At the summary 
judgment stage of the proceedings Ms. Naugle had submitted her affidavit in support of establishing 
the applicable duty of care that applies to an attorney who is alleged to be representing a mentally 
diminished client. She declared as follows in that affidavit: 
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7. I have reviewed both the 2003 and 2004 versions of IRPC 1.14. They 
specifically provide guidance for an attorney when that attorney is 
representing a person with a "disability" or with "diminished capacity." (The 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct were amended in July 2004, Rule 1.14 
addressing this issue was changed.) 
8. If Ms. Stephen disclosed at any time to the Defendants certain psychological 
conditions including that she was bi-polar and taking medications for 
psychosis, the standard of care and conduct of an attorney would be to 
investigate these conditions with Ms. Stephen's medical providers at the 
earliest opportunity after the disclosure to determine the nature and 
extent of Ms. Stephen's conditions and to determine whether Ms. 
Stephen needed a guardian. 
9. After such disclosures, if the Defendants did not investigate Ms. Stephen's 
conditions with the relevant medical care providers, the Defendant's 
conduct fell below the standard of care. 
19. If Ms. Stephen had been involuntarily committed for mental issues until 
approximately a week before the divorce trial on August 5, 2004 and was 
taking medication that may have affected her ability to understand and 
comprehend the proceedings, the standard of care would have been to seek 
a short postponement of the trial until her mental stability could be 
confirmed by a medical provider. Failing to seek a short postponement and 
telling a client that the attorney would not seek a postponement unless the 
client got a "note" from a doctor, under the circumstances, is a breach ofthe 
standard of care and conduct. 
May 27,2008 Affidavit of Cathy Naugle (italicized emphasis in original; bold/underlined emphasis 
added), as attached to Appellants' 6/2811 0 Second Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal. 
At trial, Ms. Naugle, as the testifying expert for the Plaintiff Pam Stephen on the duty of care 
owed by an attorney, first testified as to the initial duty of an attorney who is representing a 
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potentially mentally impaired client: 
Q. What would prompt your duty to investigate? 
A. Well, a number of things, I think, would, Number one, if there was 
any noticeably unusual behavior. For instance, ifthe person didn't seem to be able 
to follow a conversation or had - - or said some very bizarre things that didn't 
appear to comport with my understanding of reality, or if they - - which I've had 
before - - if they were jittery and/or nodding off, manifesting those kinds of 
physical characteristics. 
Tr., pg. 266, L. 22 to pg. 267, L. 5 (emphasis added). 
At trial, both the Plaintiff s expert, Cathy Naugle, as based upon her just -cited testimony, and 
the district court itself, initially had correctly stated the applicable threshold standard for finding a 
breach ofthe duty owed by Scott Gatewood to a client with a potentially diminished mental capacity, 
which was that he must have been able to establish a "reasonable belief' based upon Pam Stephen's 
behavior and conduct that she was likely suffering from diminished mental capacity. (district court 
statement - Tr., pg. 489, L. 6 to pg. 490, L. 1). 
But then Ms. Naugle failed to correctly apply that standard in giving her opinion as to that 
conduct which would violate the requisite standard of care. 
Q. Well, hypothetically, ifthat disclosure [of recent hospitalization] came 
on the day of trial or just before trial, and the hospitalization had occurred within two 
to three weeks of that disclosure, would that prompt a duty to investigate the 
circumstances of the hospitalization? 
A. I believe it would. 
Q. Failure to conduct that investigation would fall below the standard of 
care? 
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A. I believe it would. 
Tr., pg. 268, LL. 2-10 (bracketed reference added). 
Q. With regard to a trial date, if your client had disclosed - - this is a 
hypothetical. If the client had disclosed that the client had been involuntarily 
committed to a psychiatric ward just weeks before the trial and was prescribed 
medication that she felt was affecting her adversely, would it be the standard of 
conduct to have sought - - well, let me ask you this: Would it be the standard of 
conduct to inform the court of that situation? 
A. WeIl, I think the short answer is "yes." And I guess I'm thinking of the 
ways in which one would inform the court, depending upon how close to trial it was. 
If there was - - weIl, even ifthere wasn't time, I think that the first - - the first duty 
would be to probably corroborate that information with the medical practitioners that 
were involved. And then, if that was, indeed, the case, to - - to probably ask for a 
continuance. And in that way inform the court in an affidavit or in chambers or in 
open court. 
Q. And finaIly, based on that hypothetical, the failure to so act would fall 
below the standard of care? 
A. To so act in not informing the court? 
Q. Or seeking a continuance? 
A. If the - - if that information was corroborated. Yes. I believe so. 
Q. And then it would be the duty of the attorney to corroborate that 
information? 
A. Yes. 
Tr., pg. 269, L. 17 to pg. 270, L. 19). 
Based upon Ms. Naugle's declarations made in this testimony that she provided at trial on 
the applicable duty, and what constitutes a breach of that duty by a lawyer, it is conceivable that a 
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lawyer could be compelled to act even when his client is completely rational, coherent, articulate, 
and otherwise acting within all conventional standards of reason and behavior, which in other words 
could present a situation in which the client - by all meaningful standards - is completely competent. 
The appellants will accept at face value the district court's declarations that, although the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Responsibility cannot be used as a basis for civil liability, they can be 
relied upon to define a duty in negligence. (Tr., pg. 64, LL. 3-14; Oct. 3, 2008 Findings of Fact, at 
pp. 7-8, as attached to Appellant's 12/2109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal). With the 
exception of the state of Washington, J most states that have addressed this question have held that 
although professional ethical standards provide some evidence ofthe standard of care and duty that 
applies to an attorney in a legal malpractice action, a violation of those ethical standards, standing 
alone, is insufficient to establish a claim oflegal malpractice. See generally, Admissibility and Effect 
of Evidence of Professional Ethics Rules in Legal Malpractice Action, 50 ALR5th 301. The 
Supreme Court of New Jersey in Baxt v. Li/oia, 714 A.2d 271,274-77 (N.J. 1998) provides an 
analysis of the policy considerations, and the actions that have been taken by the various states, in 
addressing this question. 
To the extent that Idaho has not yet weighed in on this issue, the more broadly adopted 
In Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1992) the Washington Supreme Court 
held that the Rules of Professional Responsibility are inadmissible in a legal malpractice proceeding, 
even as "some evidence" of the standard of care that an attorney owes to his client. See generally, 
Greenough, The Inadmissibility of Professional Ethical Standards in Legal Malpractice Actions 
After Hizey v. Carpenter, 68 Wash.L.Rev. 395 (1993). 
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approach of allowing the ethics rules to provide some evidence of the applicable duty, but not as 
providing the sole basis for imposing per se liability based only upon a violation of an ethics rule, 
would appear to be the appropriate course to follow. 
The primary guiding principles for actions to be taken by a lawyer under Rule 1.14 are: (1) 
the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the 
client; (2) the lawyer should take the least restrictive action that is possible; (3) the lawyer should 
avoid any disclosure that would adversely affect the client; and (4) the lawyer should only act at all 
after first establishing a "reasonable belief' the client suffers from diminished mental capacity, and 
as a consequence. lacks the requisite competency to undertake the particular action that is 
contemplated. See generally, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.14, at pp. 
231-246 (Center for Professional Responsibility, American Bar Association, 2003); American Bar 
Association, Formal Ethics Opinion 96-404, Client Under A Disability;2 and Restatement (Third) 
of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 24, A Client with Diminished Capacity, at pp. 188-194 (American 
Law Institute, 2000).3 
ABA Formal Ethics Opinions do not have any particular precedential effect, See e. g. , 
Frye v. Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc., 129 P.3d 408, 426, fn. 12 (Ca1.2006); and In Re Meador. 
968 S.W.2d 346, 349 fn. 1 (Tex. 1998) ("ABA Opinions are binding upon no one."). Formal Opinion 
96-404 should nonetheless be accorded some persuasive force here due to the extent that it 
authoritatively addresses the very question that is pending before this Court on this appeal. 
3 Although the general rule in Idaho is that the Restatement is not law unless it has been 
adopted by the Supreme Court, the questions to be resolved on this appeal involve standards 
addressed by the Restatement (Third) the Law Governing Lawyers that are not inconsistent with 
existing Idaho precedents, or that cannot be completely resolved by reliance upon other provisions 
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One commentator has opined that the very act of intervention on behalf of a client with 
diminished competence implicates a whole host of ethical issues including loyalty, trust, zeal, and 
confidentiality, and that such intervention necessarily places the lawyer in an adversarial posture with 
his own client. See, Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the 
Questionably Competent Client, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 515. Consequently, when this "duty" to a client 
with diminished capacity is raised in the context of an act of alleged negligence by a lawyer that 
amounts to malpractice, that duty must be based upon something more than the lawyer's mere 
knowledge of the client's diagnosed condition, or the mere fact of the client's recent treatment or 
hospitalization. 
Up to the date that this brief was filed with the Court, counsel for the appellants was unable 
to locate any appellate decision from any jurisdiction in which Model Rule 1.14 had been addressed 
as a basis for legal malpractice liability. Therefore, in the absence of any guiding authority that is 
directly on point, the appellants urge this Court to adopt as a benchmark standard when addressing 
a negligence duty derived from Rule 1.14 the "reasonable belief' standard stated in subsection (b) 
of Rule 1.14, as more fully explained in Comment 6 to that rule, which comment declares as follows: 
[6] In determining the extent of the client's diminished capacity, the lawyer 
should consider and balance such factors as: the client's ability to articulate reasoning 
leading to a decision, variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate 
consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the 
of current Idaho law. See e.g., Estate ofSkvorak v. Security Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16,22, 
89 P.3d 856,862 (2004); and Diamondv. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 149-150,804 P.2d 
319,322-23 (1990). 
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consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the 
client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an 
appropriate diagnostician 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct at pg. 232. In addition, in ABA Formal Opinion 
No. 96-404 the authors of the that opinion stated that, "Rule 1.14(b) does not authorize the lawyer 
to take protective action because the client is not acting in what the lawyer believes to be the client's 
best interest, but only when the client 'cannot adequately act in the client's own interest.'" 
ABAIBNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct, at pg. 47 (Italicized emphasis in original). 
This statement was further clarified in the following footnote: 
In other words, the client's capacity must be judged against the standard set 
by that person's own habitual or considered standards of behavior and values, rather 
than against conventional standards held by others. [citation omitted] 
ABA Formal Opn. No. 96-404, at fn. 5 (bracketed reference added). 
The evidence that was presented at trial, as examined in the following section of this 
argument, will reveal two significant facts. First, there was never any evidence based upon Pam 
Stephen's behavior that raised even an implication that she was not competent to act on her own 
behalf, notwithstanding the fact that Scott Gatewood was fully aware of her bi-polar diagnosis, her 
hospitalizations, and his strong suspicions that she was using methamphetamine. Second, 
notwithstanding the extent ofthe knowledge that Scott Gatewood possessed, there was no evidence 
presented at trial that established an actual determination that Pam Stephen was ever incompetent 
to act on her own behalf during the August 2004 divorce proceedings. 
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B. The Evidence Presented In This Case Did Not Establish That Scott Gatewood Breached 
His Duty In Representin~ A Client With An Alle~ed Diminished Mental Capacity 
No evidence was presented at trial competent to support the premise that Scott Gatewood 
should have ever formed a reasonable belief that his client Pam Stephen was not competent to 
conduct her own affairs or to enter into a binding stipulation that was incorporated into the divorce 
judgment. 
Pam Stephen made a pretrial determination not to present any medical testimony as to her 
mental capacity at the time the divorce settlement was entered into on August 5, 2004. (Tr., pg. 84, 
LL. 4-23; pg. 91, LL. 3-7). Pam Stephen presented evidence from two expert witnesses: Sam 
Hoagland and Cathy Naugle. 
Sam Hoagland, an Idaho attorney in good standing, and an Idaho pharmacist in good 
standing, testified on the nature of the potential side effects of the prescription drugs Pam Stephen 
was taking at the time of the divorce proceeding, (Tr., pp. 335-384). Although Mr. Hoagland 
discussed the general effects of the prescription drugs that Pam Stephen was taking, he declared on 
cross-examination that he had never even seen Pam Stephen before the day of trial, much less 
observed, or reviewed, or recorded any of the side-effects that she may have been experiencing at 
the time of the divorce proceeding as a result of prescription drugs she may have been using. (Tr., 
pg. 369, L. 24 to pg. 370, L. 3; Tr., pg. 370, LL. 10-14; Tr., pg. 374, LL. 24-25 & pg. 375, LL. 8-16). 
At the time the district court denied the defendants' Rule 50 motion for dismissal it declared that it 
was not relying upon Mr. Hoagland's testimony to support a determination of whether Ms. Stephen 
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was mentally impaired. (Tr., pg. 490, LL. 14-22). 
Cathy Naugle's expert testimony has already been reviewed in the previous argument section 
concerning the establishment of the duty of care that Scott Gatewood was alleged to have breached. 
(Tr., pp. 252-283). In her testimony she offered no opinion or evaluation as to the occurrence of any 
breach of a duty by Mr. Gatewood based upon her knowledge of the facts of this case. 
The only other testimony offered at trial, or that is contained in the record on appeal, which 
goes to the issue of Pam Stephen's mental capacity at the time of the August 5, 2004 divorce 
proceeding was that of Ann Shepard, the attorney representing Gary Stephen in the divorce 
proceeding, the testimony of Scott Gatewood, the affidavit of Gary Stephen offered at summary 
judgment, the record of Judge Day inquiring with Pam Stephen at the time the stipulation was put 
on the record in the divorce proceeding, and the trial testimony of Pam Stephen herself. In addition, 
Boise attorney Steve Beer conducted a mediation with Pam and Gary Stephen and communicated 
about those mediation proceedings with legal counsel for the parties. At no time did Mr. Beer 
indicate in those communications that he believed that Pam Stephen was incompetent or lacked 
sufficient mental capacity to enter into the proposed property settlement agreement that was the 
subject of that mediation. 
Pam Stephen testified on cross-examination at the August 2008 malpractice trial that she 
understood the proceedings that were then taking place, such that she was competent at that time to 
render an opinion as to her own mental condition at the time of the August 2004 divorce 
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proceedings. (Tr., pg. 467, L. 21 to pg. 468, L. 2). During the entire course of her testimony at the 
August 2008 malpractice trial, (Tr., pp. 408-474), she never declared that it was either her belief or 
understanding that she had not been mentally competent to participate in the divorce proceedings, 
and enter into a binding stipulation at the conclusion of the August 2004 divorce proceedings. The 
following portions of Pam Stephen's testimony were those that most directly addressed this mental 
competency issue. (Tr., pp. 408-427; 446-449; 460-469). 
Pam Stephen's testimony at the malpractice trial only established that she lacked specific 
recollection in August 2008 of what happened in August 2004. Ann Shepard, who was the opposing 
counsel representing Gary Stephen in the 2004 divorce proceeding, also testified at the 2008 
malpractice trial (Tr., pg. 498-543), and she also testified that she lacked specific recollection about 
any number of events that occurred at the time of the divorce proceeding in 2004. (Tr., pg. 498, L. 
25 to pg. 499, L. 6; pp. 499, LL. 19-23; Tr., pg 521, LL. 1-4; pg. 521, L. 16 to pg. 522, L.l; pg. 523, 
LL. 18-20; pg. 524 LL. 8-17). Nor could Scott Gatewood recall with specific detail matters that were 
addressed in the 2004 divorce proceedings. (Tr., pg. 219, LL. 18-21; pg. 220, LL. 18-19; pg., 222 
LL. 13-15; pg. 229, LL. 13-18). Consequently, the fact that in August of2008 Pam Stephen could 
not perfectly recollect the events that had occurred four years earlier in August of 2004 is not 
particularly relevant to the question of whether she actually suffered from any diminished mental 
capacity in August 2004 that would have triggered a duty in Scott Gatewood to take protective 
measures on her behalf, or that established that she was not competent to enter into, and be bound 
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by, the 2004 judgment. 
Ann Shepard did recall and testify that she did not observe anything unusual about Pam 
Stephen's conduct at the time of the divorce proceeding in August 2004, (Tr., pg. 499, L. 24 to pg. 
500, L. 6), but only that Ms. Stephen appeared angry, and was unhappy that she was not getting more 
money (Tr., pg 520, LL. 1-10). 
Even Pam Stephen's ex-husband, Gary Stephen, did not state in his May 27,2008 affidavit 
submitted in opposition to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment that Pam Stephen lacked 
competence to understand the proceedings or to enter into a stipulation. He only stated in respect 
to her participation in the mediation session before Steve Beer that: 
I observed that Pam was lethargic and watched her rest her head on the table several 
times. When Pam was sitting upright, should would rock back and forth in her chair 
and appeared incoherent at times. I even offered to drive Pam horne after the 
mediation, because I was concerned about her ability to drive. 
Gary Stephen's Affidavit, ~ 5, at pg. 2, as attached to Appellants' 6/24/10 Second Motion to 
Augment the Record on Appeal. This conduct and behavior of Pam Stephen that Gary Stephen had 
observed occurred during the mediation conducted before the mediator Steve Beer - not before Mr. 
Gatewood4 - and his observations were not revealed until Mr. Stephen submitted his affidavit to the 
court in May 2008. 
As just noted, Boise Attorney Steve Beer conducted a mediation between Gary Stephen and 
4 The Plaintiff s expert Cathy Naugle testified that it is the general practice in divorce 
cases that the attorneys representing the respective parties do not attend mediations. (Tr., pg. 269, 
LL. 8-13). 
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Pam Stephen that resolved a majority of the parties' personal property issues. This mediation 
occurred over several weeks with the first meeting occurring prior to July 19, 2004, one meeting on 
July 28, 2004, and the final meeting on August 4,2004. (Tr., pg. 216, LL. 7-25; Tr. pg., 235, LL. 
1-3). Mr. Gatewood did not receive any information from Steve Beer that indicated that Pam 
Stephen lacked the mental capacity to participate in that mediation, or to make reasoned decisions. 
(Tr., pg. 222, LL. 18-25). Steve Beer sent emails to both attorneys for the respective parties 
concerning the progress of the mediation, and at no time did he raise any concern about the 
possibility that Pam Stephen was not competent to understand the proceedings, or enter into a 
binding stipulation. See, Exhibit C to May 5, 2008 Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, as attached to Appellant's June 24, 2010 Second Motion to Augment the 
Record on Appeal. 
Finally, Scott Gatewood testified that Pam Stephen had disclosed to him that she was bi-
polar at their first meeting when she was seeking to retain his services to represent her in the divorce 
proceeding commenced by her husband, Gary Stephen. (Tr., pg. 146, L. 22, to pg. 147, L. 7); Mr. 
Gatewood's written notes, as introduced at trial as Exhibits 120-123, also indicate his early 
knowledge of her psychological condition. Mr. Gatewood also testified that he observed nothing in 
Pam Stephen's conduct or behavior at the time of the August 2004 trial that was unusual or out of 
character for her, and that she understood and comprehended the proceedings, was able to 
productively participate in the discussions, and make required decisions. (Tr., pg. 165, L. 21 to pg. 
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166, L. 13; pg. 217, LL. 1-19; pg. 220, LL. 6-9; pg. 226, L. 25 to pg. 228, L. 13). Mr. Gatewood 
also testified that Pam Stephen had prepared the extensive handwritten notes, admitted at trial as 
Exhibit 204, in response to discovery requests. (Tr., pg. 287, LL. 10-12). 
Judge Day, who was the presiding judge in the divorce proceeding had been previously 
informed about Pam Stephen's bi-polar condition at the pre-trial conference. (Tr., pg. 209, LL. 2-
17). The most equivocal declaration Pam Stephen made during the divorce proceedings was her 
recitation before Judge Day, as recounted at the malpractice trial in a question by the district court 
directed to Mr. Gatewood, that she did believe the stipulation to be a fair and equitable division of 
the parties' community property, "As far as I know." (Tr., pg. 604, L. 1 to pg. 605, L. 5). 
Apart from the acknowledged facts that Pam Stephen had a bi-polar disorder, that she had 
been hospitalized, and that she had engaged in illegal drug use, there is nothing within the totality 
of the evidence and testimony that was presented at trial which reveals any conduct or behavior by 
Pam Stephen that would have provided a "reasonable belief' in Scott Gatewood that she was not 
competent to enter into the divorce stipUlation. In the absence of such evidence, the district court's 
decision in finding that Scott Gatewood did breach his duty to a client with diminished capacity, 
which breach constituted legal malpractice, must be found to be in error, as addressed in the 
following section of this argument. 
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C. The District Court Erred In Its Determination That The Respondent Pam Stephen 
Lacked Sufficient Mental Capacity To Knowingly And Voluntarily Enter Into The 
Stipulated Settlement Of The Divorce Action 
In its findings of fact the district court outlined three issues that it was deciding which 
resulted in the determination that, in his representation of Ms. Stephen, Mr. Gatewood had breached 
the applicable duty of care, which breach constituted malpractice. 
The issues that this Court must resolve in this case are as follows: 
1. Was the Plaintiff impaired due to her hi-polar condition and the 
medications she was taking during the course of the attorney-client 
relationship and at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce and did the 
Defendant Gatewood breach his duties as to an impaired client during his 
representation of the Plaintiff? Did the Defendant Gatewood adequately 
communicate information about the property issues in the divorce 
proceedings with the Plaintiff? 
2. Did the Defendant Gatewood breach the duty to investigate the value and 
dehts of the community real property during his representation of the 
Plaintiff? 
3. Was the breach of duty the proximate cause of any damages to Plaintiff? 
(Oct. 3, 2008 Findings of Fact at pg. 2, LL. 10-20 (emphasis added), as attached to Appellant's 
12121109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal). 
The district court found that the Appellant Scott Gatewood breached two duties to the 
Respondent Stephen upon which malpractice liability could be based: 
The Court then will find that because of Gatewood's failure to properly 
investigate the fair market value of the property along with the correct amount of 
indebtedness owing against the property, coupled with the Plaintiff's questionable 
mental health status, that the Plaintiff, as a proximate result of Gatewood's breach 
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of duty on all of these issues, did not receive an equitable award of community real 
property. 
(Oct. 3,2008 Findings of Fact at pg. 11, as attached to Appellant's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the 
Record on Appeal). 
Though this Court cannot make a finding from the evidence presented in this case 
that the Plaintiff was impaired to the point that she was incompetent, the Court can 
find from the evidence the Plaintiff was not in a state of mind to comprehend all of 
the issues she was facing in this litigation in a knowing and intelligent manner. 
(Oct. 3,2008 Findings of Fact at pg. 9). The district court's finding in this case also appeared to be 
bolstered by its conclusion - otherwise unsupported by the record on appeal- that Pam Stephen had 
actually been adjudicated incompetent and involuntarily committed to the hospital July 2004: 
Considering that the standard for an involuntary mental hospitalization requires a 
finding by a court that the patient is mentally ill, likely to injure herself or others or 
is gravely disable due to mental illness; and lacks capacity to make informed 
decisions about treatment, the Court must concur with Ms. Naugle's opinion. 
Oct. 3,2008 Findings of Fact at pp. 8-9. Pam Stephen only testified at the malpractice trial that she 
had been "involuntarily" committed because apparently she had been transported to the hospital by 
the police. (Tr., pg. 413, L. 18 to pg. 414, L. 21). 
The district court erred in holding that Scott Gatewood breached his duty in the 
representation of a mentally impaired client by relying only upon the fact of Ms. Stephen's diagnosis 
as bi-polar and her recent hospitalization, but without requiring any actual manifestation of resulting 
conduct or behavior indicative of diminished competence. Even if the district court had both 
recognized, and applied, the correct trigger point at which an attorney's duty to act in order to protect 
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a client with diminished mental capacity arises, the evidence that was presented to the district court, 
and that is in the record on appeal before this Court, was insufficient to establish that trigger point. 
The conduct and behavior of Pam Stephen both on - and immediately before - August 5, 
2004 was not abnormal, irrational, incoherent, or at material variance with her normal conduct and 
behavior, as observed by Scott Gatewood, in order to create a "reasonable belief' in Scott Gatewood 
that Ms. Stephen lacked the required and necessary sufficient mental capacity to knowingly and 
voluntarily enter into a binding stipulation that would become an enforceable judgment. 
In her own testimony, Pam Stephen declared that she was not using methamphetamine at the 
time of the divorce trial. (Tr., pg. 427, LL. 4-11). Therefore, the only issues concerning the state 
of her mental capacity as affected by drug use at the time of the divorce proceeding were the 
prescription drugs that she was taking - or not taking - and her bi-polar mental condition, and the 
fact of her then-recent hospitalization. 
The Plaintiff s own expert, Ms. Naugle, testified on cross-examination that the mere fact that 
a client has been diagnosed as bi-polar does not automatically result in a determination that the client 
has diminished mental capacity. (Tr., pg. 280, L. 22 to pg. 281, L. 5). Ms. Naugle further testified 
on cross-examination that she personally has never sought to have a guardian appointed for a bi-polar 
client. (Tr., pg. 276, LL. 13-24). 
The district court in its findings of fact declared that Mr. Gatewood's representation of 
Stephen fell below the required standard of care on the basis that Ms. Stephen had been discharged 
from a hospital after an involuntary commitment just five days prior to trial. (Oct. 3,2008 Findings 
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of Fact, pg. 4, L 26; pg. 6, LL. 20-21; pg. 7, LL. 5-6; and pg. 8, LL. 14-15 & LL. 23-24, as attached 
to Appellant's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal). In direct examination by her 
own attorney Stephen confirmed that she was hospitalized on July 22, 2004 (Tr., pg. 413, LL. 18-21). 
She was discharged on July 27,2004 (Tr., pg. 414, LL. 19-21). The divorce proceedings took place 
on August 5, 2004, such that a period of nine or ten days had passed between the time that she was 
discharged and the date of the divorce proceeding. Furthermore, Ms. Stephen testified that she did 
not remember if she had told Mr. Gatewood that she had been hospitalized prior to the date of the 
divorce hearing. (Tr., pg. 415, LL. 12-13). 
Nonetheless, in his own testimony at trial Mr. Gatewood indicated that he was aware that Ms. 
Stephen had been hospitalized prior to the scheduled August 5, 2004 trial date, but that his personal 
interactions with Stephen did not indicate that she was impaired to such an extent that she was not 
capable of competently participating in the proceedings or in making decisions. (Tr., pg. 219, LL. 
9-17; pg. 226, L. 25 to pg. 228, L. 14). The opposing counsel in the divorce proceedings, Ann 
Shepard, testified that she observed nothing unusual in Ms. Stephen's behavior on August 5, 2004. 
(Tr., pg. 499, L. 24 to pg. 500, L. 6). In addition, Ms. Stephen had also participated in a mediation 
conducted by attorney Stephen Beer after her July 22-27, 2004 hospitalization that resulted in a 
settlement of most property issues. (Tr., pg. 222, L. 18 to pg. 223, L. 7). The last day of that 
mediation withMr. Beer was August 4, 2004, the day before the scheduled August 5, 2004 trial. (Tr., 
pg. 235, LL. 1-3). 
In the face of this evidence establishing that by her actions, words, and behavior Pam 
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Stephen's conduct would not have provided Scott Gatewood with an basis to form a reasonable 
belief that she suffered from diminished mental capacity on August 5, 2004, such that she was 
incompetent to enter into the stipulated judgment. Consequently, the district court's decision that 
Scott Gatewood breached a duty based only upon the fact of Pam Stephen's previously disclosed bi-
polar condition, and her recent hospitalization, is in error and must be reversed. 
D. If Deemed "Competent" Pam Stephen's Malpractice Claim Was Barred By The 
Doctrines Of "Judicial Estoppel" And "Judgmental Immunity," But Even If Such 
Immunity Did Not Exist, Scott Gatewood's Conduct Did Not Breach Any Duty That 
He Owed to Pam Stephen 
It is also significant to note that at no time prior to filing this malpractice action did Pam 
Stephen ever move to set aside the stipulated divorce decree on the basis that it was inherently unfair, 
or that she lacked the necessary capacity to enter into a binding stipulation to settle that litigation. 
It is also significant to note that throughout these proceedings Pam Stephen's primary 
concern was obtaining maintenance. (Tr., pg. 419, L. 19 to pg. 420, L. 13 - Mr. Clark discussing Ms. 
Stephen's expectations; Tr., pg. 186, LL. 5-9; pg. 191, LL. 3-19). 
The rule of judicial estoppel, as applied in this context by the Court in Heinze v. Bauer, 145 
Idaho 232, 178 P.3d 597 (2008), in reliance upon the earlier decision issued in McKay v. Owens, 130 
Idaho 148,937 P.2d 1222 (1997), establishes that if the Respondent Stephen was chargeable with 
knowledge of the relevant facts necessary to knowingly and voluntarily enter into the stipulation 
settling her divorce, then she cannot subsequently bring a malpractice action against Gatewood based 
upon allegations that she was not chargeable with that knowledge. 
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Under the "judgmental immunity rule," as summarized in Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. 
Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 Idaho 1,5,981 P.2d 236,240 (1999), an attorney is immunized 
from malpractice liability based upon an exercise of informed judgment in good faith in the conduct 
and settlement of Ii tigation. 
In denying the defendants' motion for a Rule 50 dismissal the district court stated that the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel only applies when a party can be charged with a knowledge and 
understanding of the proceedings that were taking place. (Tr., pg. 492, L. 11 to pg. 493, L. 12). As 
already fully argued above, the district court misapplied both the applicable standard of care that 
Scott Gatewood was to be held to in his representation of Pam Stephen, and misapplied the evidence 
that had been presented to that court as establishing that Ms. Stephen did in fact suffer from 
diminished mental capacity, which prevented her from knowingly and voluntarily entering to the 
stipulated judgment. In the absence of evidence establishing such a diminished capacity by the 
client, the doctrines of judicial estoppel and judgmental immunity barred Ms. Stephen's malpractice 
action against Scott Gatewood, and that judgment must be reversed. 
Apart from the question of whether Stephen was mentally impaired to the extent that she was 
unable to knowingly and voluntarily enter into the stipulation settling her divorce, the district court 
also held that Gatewood breached his duty in respect to the valuation of the community residence 
located on Crescent Rim in Boise, and in the proper allocation of community debt in respect to 
another property located on Beach Street in Boise. (Oct. 3, 208 Findings of Fact at pg. 11; as 
attached to Appellant's 12/21109 Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal). 
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Scott Gatewood was confronted with a situation in which the best opportunity for a favorable 
resolution of the case for his client was the settlement offered by Ann Shepard. Mr. Gatewood 
testified about unfavorable issues that were emerging in the case that had not been disclosed to him 
by Pam Stephen. (Tr., pg. 184, L. 2 to pg. 186, L. 24). Ms. Shepard had advised Scott Gatewood 
that considering the underlying facts of this particular case, that she thought she could get a better 
deal for Gary Stephen if they went to trial, but was willing to make the favorable offer in order settle 
the matter without a trial. (Tr., pg. 510, L. 12 to pg. 513, L. 5). Scott Gatewood concurred with Ms. 
Shepard's assessment that he would be unlikely to obtain a better deal for his client, Pam Stephen, 
at trial, than he would be able to obtain through the offered settlement. (Tr., pg. 184, LL. 2-22). 
In respect to the valuation of the Crescent Rim residence, which figured so prominently in 
the district court's decision, Ann Shepard testified that the $500,000 figure was simply pulled out 
of the air for purposes of submitting a response to an interrogatory. (Tr., pg. 504, L. 14 to pg. 505, 
L. 12; pg. 539, L. 10 to pg. 540, L. 8). At the time the divorce stipulation was entered into there was 
no apparent dispute over the valuation ofthe Crescent Rim residence. (Tr., pg. 228, L. 15 to pg. 229, 
L. 1). Ann Shepard further testified that when the parties to a divorce come to an agreement on the 
valuation ofthe real property it is not unusual not to seek any further appraisal as to the value ofthat 
property. (Tr., pg. 541, L. 21 to pg. 542, L. 6). The Plaintiffs expert, Cathy Naugle, also testified 
that, in her own law practice, she also often only relies upon valuations provided by her clients. (Tr., 
pg. 282, L. 21 to pg. 283, L. 14). Ann Shepard also testified that there was significant damage to the 
Crescent Rim house. (Tr., pg. 506, L. 3 to pg. 507, L. 9; pg. 511, LL. 9-11; pg. 512, LL. 21-24). 
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Both Ann Shepard and Scott Gatewood testified at the malpractice trial that if this divorce 
case had gone to trial that the Beach Street property would likely have been characterized as separate 
-rather than community- property, that was owned by Gary Stephen. (Tr., pg. 294, LL 7-18 - Scott 
Gatewood; and Tr., pg. 502, LL. 7 -24 - Ann Shepard). In addition there had been significant damage 
to the Beach Street house. (Tr., pg. 524, L. 1 to pg. 525, L. 24). 
The district court only relied upon Gary Stephen's response to an interrogatory III 
characterizing the Beach Street house as community property. An answer to an interrogatory does 
not satisfy Idaho's requirement for the transmutation of property. Accepting for the purposes ofthis 
argument that the Beach Street property would have been determined to be Gary Stephen's separate 
property at trial, and that it had a value of$1 05,000 and a debt of$85,000 (Tr., pg. 294, LL. 19-24), 
that $20,000 swing to Gary Stephen would have almost entirely wiped out the amount of damages 
that were awarded against Scott Gatewood in this action. 
Somewhat ironically, during the pretrial proceedings in this case the district judge declared, 
based upon his own past experience as a practicing lawyer, that sometimes parties in a divorce 
proceeding will concede certain issues - even those upon which they might otherwise prevail - in 
order to simply reach a resolution of the case. (Tr., pg. 80, LL. 1-7). In addition, a challenge that 
is only made to particular assets, rather than to the entire settlement of the case, violates the rule that 
a party in a divorce cannot pick and choose as between those items of property in which it is deemed 
that the property settlement is inequitable and others in which it is not. McGrew v. McGrew, 139 
Idaho 551, 559, 82 P.3d 833, 841 (2003). 
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To establish a rule that a lawyer commits malpractice by failing to maximize the potential 
value of every asset in a divorce to the benefit of his client, eliminates the flexibility, that as a 
practical matter, is necessary in nearly every divorce case to reach settlements that allow the parties 
to separate and to get on with their lives. The facts of this case do not support the conclusion that 
Scott Gatewood breached any duty to Pam Stephen in failing to squeeze every possible dollar out 
of the valuation of the Crescent Rim house, but instead only indicate that he made a judgment that 
there would many unfavorable facts that would make obtaining a better deal for his client at trial 
more unlikely, than what he could obtain through a settlement. Therefore, this Court should reverse 
the malpractice judgment that was entered against Scott Gatewood in this case. 
E. Malpractice Liability Cannot Be Imposed Upon A Law Firm - As A Matter Of Law 
The malpractice judgment in this case was entered against Scott Gatewood, individually, and 
against the law firm, Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. Post-judgment arguments were made to the district 
court on the question of whether Dennis J. Sallaz could be personally liable for the judgment entered 
against Scott Gatewood and Sallaz & Gatewood Chtd., based upon that firm's alleged earlier 
incarnation as general partnership. (Tr., pg. 630, L. 17, to pg. 634, L. 2). 
In Owyhee Countyv. Rife, 100 Idaho 91,593 P.2d 995 (1979) the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that under I.C. § 5-219.4 malpractice liability can only be imposed persons or entities that are 
"licensed" to practice a profession. 100 Idaho at 95-96,593 P.2d at 999-1000. The critical phrase 
in subsection 4 of I. C. § 5-219 is the third to last sentence in that subsection, which declares that: 
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The term "professional malpractice" as used herein refers to wrongful acts or 
omissions in the performance of professional services by any person, firm, 
association, entity or corporation licensed to perform such services under the law of 
the state of Idaho. 
Only individual persons - not law firms - can be licensed to practice law in Idaho. I.e. § 3-
101. In contrast, professional engineering firms can be authorized under Idaho law to engage in the 
practice engineering as an "entity," I.C. § 54-1235, such that there is apparent statutory authority to 
potentially impose malpractice liability upon such engineering firms, as entities, separate and apart 
from their licensed members and employees. 
It has long been the law in Idaho that there is vicarious liability between law partners for 
individual malpractice under the priorldahopartnership law. See e.g., Websterv. Hoopes, 126 Idaho 
96, 100,878 P.2d 795, 799 (Ct.App.1994) ("The nature of partnership liability is such that all 
partners are liable jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership ... Thomson's 
liability flowed from the partnership, and he was, therefore, liable for the alleged negligent acts of 
h· ") IS partner. . .. . 
Although Idaho's current partnership law, which became effective in 2001, has adopted the 
"entity theory," of partnership, I.C. § 53-3-201, that law also retains the principle that, "all partners 
are liable jointly and severally for all obligations of the partnership unless otherwise agreed by the 
claimant or provided by law." I.C. § 53-3-306(a) (emphasis added). Personal liability for 
malpractice committed by an individual member of a partnership, limited liability company, or a 
professional service corporation is specifically reserved under those statutes. I.C. §§ 53-3-306(c), 
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30-6-201A(3), and 30-1306. 
Notwithstanding the ability of these various entities to answer for the malpractice liability 
of a member - typically through the existence of malpractice insurance purchased for the benefit of 
the member - Idaho law appears to be unequivocal in its provision that a law firm, as an entity, 
cannot be directly sued for, or held liable for malpractice. In addition to the arguments made above 
for the reversal of the malpractice judgment in this case, the appellants also request that the 
malpractice judgment as entered against the law firm Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., be reversed on the 
basis that such liability cannot be imposed, as a matter oflaw, upon a law firm as an entity separate 
and apart from its members. 
F. The Appellants Are Entitled To An Award Of Attorney Fees Under I.e. § 12-120(3) 
On the same basis already submitted by the argument and authority submitted in support of 
an award of attorney fees on appeal in the Appellant's Opening Brief, the appellants on this 
Supplemental Brief again request an award of costs and attorney fees on this appeal ifthey should 
be the prevailing party on the questions presented here. I.A.R. 40 & 41. The appellants request an 
award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) based upon the authority of City a/McCall v. Buxton, 
146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009); and Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723,152 
P.3d 594 (2007). The appellants on this Supplemental Brief incorporate by reference the earlier 
attorney fee arguments made in their opening brief, as if set out in full herein. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons argued above, the legal malpractice judgment entered against the 
appellants should be reversed, and they should be awarded their costs and attorney fees as the 
prevailing parties on this appeal. 
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